They with the aid of transnational networks of

also use evidence by mentioning examples of actual real-life cases, and
researchers. For example, how Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and Walter Mattli
show that the ECJ has had an unexpectedly large impact on the politics of
European integration, transforming political into legal issues with the aid of
transnational networks of lawyers and judges.


do they relate?

Promise of Institutionalist Theory” is a response to “False Promise of
International Institution”


articles discuss theories and concepts such as realism, institutionalism,
relative gains consideration and concerns over cheating. They both examine how
relative gains and cheating make it sometimes difficult to achieve, and always
difficult to sustain cooperation. They also both discuss the separation between
security and political economy. Keohane and Martin state that they share
Mearsheimer’s view that there is no clean analytical line between economic and
security issues.  Lastly, both agree that
more empirical work is needed before a final judgment is rendered on the explanatory
power of liberal institutionalism. In other words, more research on this
subject needs to be carried out, by students of world politics critical of
institutionalist theory as well as by those working from it, is essential, and
will be most welcome.


Firstly, as described in
the first two sections, the articles have different conclusions and relatively different

their articles they also raise different arguments. Keohane and Martin state
that unlike Mearsheimer, they do not base their view on the overarching role of
relative gains, and that their focus is not exclusively on
“cheating.” Situations of coordination, in which cheating is not a
problem but distributional issues are serious, and equally important, although
they were underemphasized (but not absent) in the early institutionalist

Mearsheimer uses cases and
a realist point of view, to illustrate that institutions have mattered rather
little in the past. They also suggest that the false belief that institutions
matter has mattered more, has had pernicious effects. He believes that this
misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more
failures in the future. Mearsheimer’s
dismissal of international institutions implies that linkages are easy to forge
when a state desires cooperation, and that cooperation is easy to coordinate
even without institution. On the other hand, Keohane and Martin use cases to argue
that institutions have the wide range of effects attributed to them through a
liberal institutionalist point of view. They argue that institutions change the
incentives for states to cheat; they also reduce transaction costs, link
issues, and provide focal points for cooperation. They believe that in a world
politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to
experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions based
on reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace.
They argue that institutions sometimes matter for state policy, but we do not
adequately understand in what domains they matter most, under what conditions,
and how their effects are exerted.